Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary Psychology by Quartz, Steven et al.
  89 
This document is available as a preprint from http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu 
Copyright remains with the individual authors. 
Session 5: Development, Neuroscience and Evolutionary 
Psychology 
· Steven Quartz (Caltech) Toward a Developmental Evolutionary 
Psychology: Genes, Development, and the evolution of human cognitive 
architecture 
· Jackie Sullivan (Pittsburgh) Commentary 
· Peter Machamer (Pittsburgh) Commentary 
· Andrea Scarantino (Pittsburgh) Summary of Discussion 
· Workshop Participants
Proceedings of the Pittsburgh Workshop in History and Philosophy of 
Biology, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Pittsburgh, 
March 23-24 2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Steven R. Quartz2 
 
 
 
1. Rethinking the Relationship Between Development and Evolution 
1.1 The Modern Synthesis and What Was Left Behind 
After a century of intermittent dialogue between psychology and evolutionary biology, the outline of a 
synthesis between the two disciplines now appears to be emerging. The current form of this synthesis, 
known as narrow evolutionary psychology (Barkow et al., 1992; Buss, 1999), is the union of two specific 
frameworks from evolutionary biology and psychology. Specifically, narrow evolutionary psychology 
brings together the Modern Synthesis of evolutionary biology, which views evolutionary change primarily 
in terms of changes in gene frequency, with a nativist cognitive psychology, which views the mind as a 
collection of relatively autonomous, specialized processors, or modules (Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). As I 
outline in more detail below, both strands of evolutionary psychology are largely adevelopmental. There is 
accumulating evidence, however, that both evolutionary and psychological theory must incorporate a 
developmental perspective in order to construct successful theory. For example, it is now well established 
that a major route to evolutionary change is via alterations in developmental programs. If this is indeed the 
case, then evolutionary change must act in accordance with the range of possible changes to these 
programs, which in the case of behavior and cognition involves alterations to the development of the brain. 
From a psychological perspective, it is increasingly clear that ontogeny plays a far more central role in 
shaping behavior and cognition than its marginalization in nativist cognitive psychology allows (Quartz & 
Sejnowski, 1997). Any evolutionary psychology integrative framework must therefore take development 
seriously. 
 
In recent years, new evolutionary and psychological frameworks have emerged that are thoroughly 
developmental in perspective. In evolutionary theory, this developmental perspective is known as 
evolutionary developmental biology (Raff, 1996; Arthur, 1997; Hall, 1998); in psychology, this 
developmental perspective is known as developmental cognitive neuroscience (Elman et al., 1996; Quartz 
& Sejnowski, 1997) . To date, evolutionary developmental biology and developmental cognitive 
neuroscience have not been brought together to construct an alternative evolutionary psychology 
framework that places development at its center to explicitly account for the evolution of cognition in terms 
of developmental alterations to neural structures. In this chapter, I present the preliminary outlines of such a 
view, which I refer to as “developmental evolutionary psychology.” From this perspective, I will suggest 
that failing to take into account how evolution acts on developmental programs to regulate alterations in 
brain structure and function has resulted in a seriously distorted view of the evolution of cognition and the 
resulting human cognitive architecture; it has also contributed to a mischaracterization of the role of culture 
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in human development and evolution. In contrast, I will suggest that developmental evolutionary 
psychology suggests an alternative view of the human cognitive architecture that replaces the highly 
modular view of narrow evolutionary psychology with a behavioral systems view. As I explore below, this 
perspective views the human cognitive architecture as a hierarchically organized control structure, where 
this hierarchical organization is evident both evolutionarily and developmentally. Additionally, this 
perspective provides a principled means of incorporating recent results from cognitive neuroscience, which 
have tended to be marginalized in narrow evolutionary psychology. This, then, furthers the naturalistic 
stance narrow evolutionary psychology advocates but falls short of achieving. Finally, I will present 
evidence from paleoclimatology that suggests the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA) was 
markedly different from the account most prevalent in narrow evolutionary psychology. This evidence 
suggests that the selective forces underlying the evolution of the human cognitive architecture were 
critically connected to highly unstable climes, as there is an intriguing temporal coincidence of rapid 
hominid encephalization and increasing ecological instability during the Middle Pleistocene (600-150 kyr 
BP; Ruff et al., 1997). Based on these considerations, I suggest that an important feature of hominid 
evolution was a process I have referred to as progressive externalization (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997; 
Quartz, 1999), whereby the brain’s development became increasingly regulated by extrinsic factors, likely 
mediated by heterochronic changes in neural development. I suggest that this process allowed for flexible 
prefrontally mediated cognitive function, particularly in the social domain, and underlies the capacity for 
rapid changes in social structure that was a response to the need for buffering ecological instability (see 
also Potts, 1996). The upshot of this process was symbolic culture, which plays a central role in shaping the 
structures underlying human cognition (Tomasello, 1999). 
 
1.2 Taking Development Seriously 
Both components of narrow evolutionary psychology, evolutionary biology and nativist cognitive 
psychology, are largely adevelopmental. Regarding the latter, Chomsky’s work on language acquisition has 
been highly influential in the field of cognitive development. Chomsky’s principal argument concerned the 
relative impoverishment of the environment as an informational source, which he argued was too barren to 
provide sufficient information for a child equipped only with general learning mechanisms to converge on a 
grammar that would underlie language competence (see Cowie, 1998). Aimed against B.F. Skinner’s 
behaviorist analysis of language use, Chomsky argued that the child must bring certain knowledge of 
grammar to the task of language acquisition a priori. This knowledge took the form of a language organ, a 
structure containing domain-specific knowledge.  
 
Although Chomsky hypothesized such a specialized structure only for language, his arguments proved 
compelling and resulted in a widespread adoption of domain-specific organs, or modules, for a variety of 
other cognitive capacities, such as social cognition (Brothers & Ring, 1992) and numerical cognition 
(Dehaene et al., 1999). This view has led to a widely adopted modular view of the mind (Fodor, 1983; 
Hirschfeld & Gelman, 1994). This, in turn, has had major consequences for the specific proposals of 
narrow evolutionary psychology regarding the structure of the mind and its development. In particular, 
Tooby and Cosmides’(1992, pp. 93ff.; Cosmides and Tooby, 1994) critique of the Standard Social Science 
Model echoed many of Chomsky’s arguments against behaviorism’s general learning strategies (for an 
evaluation of many of these arguments in their evolutionary context, see Fodor, 2000).  
 
Although nativist cognitive psychology has been largely adevelopmental, the rise of cognitive neuroscience 
in recent years has spawned a growing interest in development. This work has in turn given rise to a 
growing developmental cognitive neuroscience (Elman et al., 1996; Johnson, 1997; Quartz, 1999). In 
contrast to nativist cognitive psychology, the cornerstone of developmental cognitive neuroscience is a 
series of new experimental results; the findings range from developmental neural plasticity at the systems 
level to single cell physiology, as I explore in more detail below. Together, these results indicate that 
human development is both more protracted and more sensitive to environmental signals than nativist 
cognitive psychology supposed; this makes it important to understand the implications of these results for 
an evolutionary psychology integrative framework. 
 
As stated above, there is another source of narrow evolutionary psychology’s adevelopmental perspective: 
the Modern Synthesis in evolutionary biology. Although embryology and evolution were considered 
 
 
 
together in the late 19th century, by the 1920s and 1930s Morgan, Dobzhansky, and others provided 
powerful arguments for why evolutionary biology should move away from the ties to embryology that 
Haeckel, Weissmann and others emphasized (for a review, see Gilbert et al., 1996). In place of 
embryology, the shapers of the Modern Synthesis argued that transmission genetics provided the most 
appropriate coupling with natural selection, culminating in the view that evolution is essentially changes in 
gene frequency. Despite the attempts of Goldschmidt in the 1930s, and Waddington in the 1940s and 
1950s, to combine evolution and development, little progress was made integrating development into 
evolutionary theory until recently. Only with major advances in the mo lecular genetics of development, 
beginning in the 1980s, have inroads been made regarding adding a developmental perspective to 
evolutionary theory. Specifically, this work has begun to demonstrate the “deep structure” of development, 
beginning with fundamentally important insights into the homologous developmental pathways underlying 
a variety of embryonic processes from drosophilia to mammals. The cornerstone result of this work was the 
discovery of homeobox genes and their striking conservation (reviewed in Hirth & Reichert, 1999; Reichert 
& Simeone, 1999). Given the enormous differences in neuroanatomy between vertebrates and 
invertebrates, their brains were long thought to be unrelated with little obvious homology. However, at a 
deeper, molecular level they are remarkably similar in that homologous regulatory genes have been 
identified that control regionalization, patterning, and identity in embryonic brain development. So striking 
are these new results that it now appears unlikely that successful evolutionary theory can be constructed 
that does not have a prominent place for development. Based on such observations, the nascent field of 
evolutionary developmental biology has emerged (for a review, see Raff, 2000). 
 
The emergence of developmental cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary developmental biology in recent 
years suggests a possible major reorientation of evolutionary psychology. As I have indicated, the major 
shortcoming of narrow evolutionary psychology is its marginalization of development, whose incorporation 
now appears essential to any satisfactory account of an evolutionary framework for human cognition and 
behavior. In what follows, I will sketch the outlines of such an approach that begins to integrate 
developmental cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary developmental biology into a view I refer to as 
developmental evolutionary psychology. As I explore, this approach adds an additional important 
constraint. Whereas both the Modern Synthesis and nativist cognitive psychology largely treat the brain as 
a black box, both evolutionary developmental biology and developmental cognitive neuroscience explicitly 
address the issue of neural structures and mechanisms. This, then, allows developmental evolutionary 
psychology to further the naturalistic perspective narrow evolutionary psychology advocates but falls short 
of by relegating neuroscience to a minor role (e.g., Tooby & Cosmides, 1992). Because developmental 
evolutionary psychology is explicit about the mechanisms and structures underlying cognition and 
behavior, it examines the nature of the deep structure in the fundamental patterning of vertebrates that both 
constrains possible evolutionary changes and facilitates morphological alterations along certain routes. The 
central questions developmental evolutionary psychology asks, then, are, what alterations in developmental 
mechanisms and processes underlie the evolution of the structure and function of the brain and sensory 
systems, how are these reflected in the organization of the human cognitive architecture, and how do these 
generate human behavior and cognition? 
 
In what follows, I sketch a response to these central questions that incorporates the insights of comparative 
neuroanatomy and the molecular genetics of development. Based on these results, I will suggest that 
narrow evolutionary psychology’s model of the human cognitive architecture, one based on massive 
modularity, is inconsistent with the permissible mechanisms underlying evolutionary alterations to neural 
structures. I then present an alternative, hierarchical behavioral systems view of the evolved human 
cognitive architecture that is based on integrating developmental cognitive neuroscience and evolutionary 
developmental biology into a developmental evolutionary psychology. More specifically, in section 2.1, I 
consider shortcomings in the trait-level analyses that have played a prominent role in adaptive thinking and 
the problematic inference to cognitive modules based on that level of analysis. To make this concrete, I 
examine Lovejoy et al.’s (1999) analysis of the hominid pelvis. This example demonstrates that relatively 
simple alterations in developmental programs can have a cascade effect and thereby alter systemic 
properties, such as the entire pelvic field, casting doubt on the sufficiency of trait level analyses. These 
considerations suggest that alterations in genomic regulatory systems is a key mediator of evolutionary 
change. Next, in section 2.2, I consider this insight from the perspective of brain evolution. In particular, I 
examine the striking finding that, despite a 10,000-fold range in neocortex size across mammals, the 
 
 
 
relative size of many brain structures is highly correlated. I review evidence indicating that heterochronic 
changes in the duration of neurogenesis result in the coordinated pattern of brain size across a variety of 
mammalian species. These results suggest that neural systems highly covary with one another as a 
consequence of the restricted range of permissible alterations that evolutionary change can act upon. This 
makes the massive modularity hypothesis of narrow evolutionary psychology untenable. In section 2.3, I 
then turn to consider whether these heterochronic changes may themselves reflect a deeper structure of 
biological design. I review evidence that demonstrates that much of the diversity of mammalian brains 
reflects the spatial organization of neural tube. This suggests that the range of permissible changes to the 
relative size of brain structures must reflect this deep structure of neural development.  
 
Based on this evidence, I conclude that, since evolutionary changes involve heterochronic alterations to 
developmental programs that result in systemic changes throughout the brain, narrow evolutionary 
psychology’s modular account of the human cognitive architecture should be replaced by one that views 
the brain as a collection of behavioral systems. In section 3, I present a proposal for one such behavioral 
systems view that is based on comparative work that identifies common design principles across a wide 
variety of nervous systems. This behavioral systems view places development at its center, suggesting an 
alternative evolutionary psychology framework that integrates developmental cognitive neuroscience and 
evolutionary developmental biology. In section 4, I consider recent work in paleoclimatology that suggests 
that the ecological conditions that may have driven hominid brain evolution were markedly different from 
the proposals of narrow evolutionary psychology and accords better with the model of cognitive 
architecture I present. In section 5, I examine this issue in more detail and consider how alterations in 
development may underlie the capacity for complex cultural learning that was a response to ecological 
instability. 
 
2. Building Brains: Development and the Units of Selection 
 
2.1. Traits, Genes, and the Morphogenetic Field 
In narrow evolutionary psychology there is a deep connection between modules and genes (e.g., Pinker, 
1997, p.32). An informal criterion of a module is that it has a semi-independent evolutionary account, 
which involves an analysis of genetic transmission under natural selection. As Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) 
note, narrow evolutionary psychologists follow the strategy of adaptive thinking in attempting to identify 
modules and their function. That is, a solution is inferred from the structure of a historical problem, which 
requires reconstructing the evolutionary context, or environment of evolutionary adaptation. This trait-level 
analysis of behavior depends on identified traits being separately heritable, corresponding to a module, so 
that evolution can act on the basis of that trait’s variation. Such a view makes strong predictions regarding 
permissible evolutionary alterations to the substrates of cognition. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising that 
this modular account of the human cognitive architecture, and the evolutionary path to it via semi-
autonomous selection of modules, has not been considered in terms of whether it is consistent with the 
emerging understanding of the paths to evolutionary change in nervous systems. There have, however, been 
many more general cautions regarding the functional identification of a trait and its putative separate 
heritability (Dobzhansky, 1956; Gould and Lewontin, 1979). Without additional constraints, a behavioral 
analysis can lead to behaviors being seen as composed of numerous characters, or modules; such trait 
atomization relies on the assumption of particulate inheritance. Put another way, the capacity to 
functionally dissect behaviors into component parts in no way entails that those components are mediated 
by modules with separable heritability.  
 
Recently, Lovejoy et al. (1999) analyzed the mammalian postcranium from a developmental perspective 
and demonstrated that trait atomization could lead to a serious distortion of cladistic analyses. Their 
specific example involved the transformation of the common ancestral pelvis into that of early hominids. 
They suggest that the evolution of the pelvis may have involved the modification of the geometry of pattern 
formation, such as a progressive increase in the slope of molecular gradients in the limb bud, initiating a 
developmental cascade that would alter the entire pelvic field. Thus, although it is possible to identify 
separable traits at the morphological level – sacrum, platypelloid birth canal, pubic symphysis, superior and 
 
 
 
inferior pubic rami, obturator foramina – none of these may have a unique evolutionary history nor be 
under separate selective pressure. Rather, the entire pelvis may be systemically modified as a function of 
alterations in development.  
 
Gilbert et al. (1996) similarly suggest that incorporating results regarding the deep structure of 
developmental programs results in a major modification of the units of selection. Rather than the gene, they 
suggest that the morphogenetic field is the basic unit of ontogeny whose alterations mediate evolution. 
Such a perspective leads naturally to the view that changes in genomic regulatory systems are the mediators 
of evolutionary change (Davidson, 2001). This observation merits further investigation, as it is of central 
importance to an evolutionary psychology perspective. That is, what is the range of permissible 
evolutionary alterations to nervous systems, and does analysis at a behavioral trait level result in a distorted 
account?  
 
2.2 Scaling Brains  
The first question to ask is, what processes underlie changes in the size of brain structures? The 
organization and neuropharmacology of the brain stem, which mediates basic homeostatic functions, 
appear to be highly conserved across species (Ross et al., 1984). In contrast, there is a 10,000-fold range in 
neocortex size across mammals. A uniquely mammalian structure, neocortex occupies a disproportionate 
percentage of total brain mass in anthropoid primates (monkeys, apes, and humans), from 60-80% of the 
total (Nieuwenhuys et al., 1998). The disproportionate increase in neorcortex size in anthropoid primates is 
believed to reflect important cognitive and behavioral skills that underlie complex social and cognitive 
functions. Indeed, this disproportionate increase is referred to as encephalization and is the basis for the 
important view that anthropoid evolution is in part characterized by the increasing cortical mediation of 
complex behavior and cognition.3   
 
Given the enormous range of neocortex size across mammals in terms of both relative and absolute sizes, it 
is important to consider what mechanisms and processes determine these differences and along what 
dimensions these differences lie. Neocortex is not unconstrained to change across all dimensions. Indeed, 
the thickness and the general organization of neocortex differs relatively little across species.4 Rather, 
neocortex across species is organized into radially oriented, vertically interconnected columns, and shares a 
horizontal organization into layers designated I-VI. Cortical circuitry also shares basic themes, with deep 
layers (VI and V) sending efferent to subcortical and cortical structures, the middle layer (IV) receiving 
afferents from the thalamus, and with the upper layers (II and III) integrating information within the cortex. 
Phenotypic variability in the size, number, and interconnectedness of cortical areas thus underlie species 
differences in behavior and cognition.  
 
Alterations in the size of neocortex appear to be mediated primarily by the number of neurons and their 
supporting elements. It is possible to increase the size of neurons, however this would require a complex 
recalibration of their physiological properties, which in turn would require novel biophysical mechanisms 
that instead appear to be highly conserved. Thus, while larger brains do tend to have larger neurons, this 
increased size is not highly significant and does not account for differences in brain size. Based on this and 
other considerations, a possible route to neocortical diversity is via evolutionary modifications of the 
program of cortical development. The fact that neocortex does not vary across all dimensions, but retains 
common organizational themes such as radial and laminar organization, suggests that only a portion of 
cortical development programs differ, making it possible to use a comparative methodology across species 
to assess alterations in cortical development programs. Combined with other experimental techniques, such 
as gene knockout experiments, it is possible to identify the processes underlying neocortical diversity.  
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One process underlying alterations in the size of body parts, including the brain, involves alterations to cell 
proliferation. The three-dimensional neuronal organization of the neocortex develops from a two-
dimensional sheet of proliferating cells during a restricted period of early development (McConnell, 1995; 
Rakic, 1988). During early gestation, the anterior-most end of the neural tube expands outwards, forming a 
pair of telencephalic vesicles that become the cerebral hemispheres. Neurons are not generated in the 
region they will occupy in the mature organism. Instead, they are generated in the ventricular zone (VZ), a 
primitive epithelial sheet of dividing cells that line the cerebral ventricles. Prior to neurogenesis, these 
progenitor cells divide symmetrically to establish a precursor pool. The onset of neurogenesis is marked by 
the first postmitotic cells leaving the ventricular zone and migrating along radial glial fibers, eventually 
forming a structure known as the cortical plate. As more postmitotic cells migrate out into the cortical plate, 
they do so in an inside-out temporal sequence, generating the layers of the neocortex, with later migrating 
cells forming the more superficial layers.  
 
One potential route to building specialized brain structures, such as modules, would be through modulating 
the process of neurogenesis, whereby specific precursor populations would be generated and migrate to a 
specific neocortical site. For such a strategy to be feasible, the process of neurogenesis would have to be 
dissociable and thus restricted phases of neurogenesis would be under natural selection. It is  possible to 
investigate this possibility through a comparative method, as it makes a strong prediction: if natural 
selection operates on neurogenesis in this way, then the size of some individual brain structures in different 
species should diverge from the relative size of other structures. That is, the relationship among brain 
structures across species should not show strong signs of linked regularities.  
 
Heinz Stephan and colleagues published a series of volumetric data sets for eleven brain divisions and for 
more discrete nuclei and zones for a large sample of insectivores, prosimians, simians, and bats (Stephen et 
al., 1981; Frahm et al., 1982) that has become a widely used dataset to analyze comparative brain 
structures. Using a factor analytic approach, Finlay and Darlington (1995) found that the size of various 
brain structures across 131 mammalian species was highly correlated, with the primary exception of the 
olfactory bulb. In general, the relative proportions of different brain structures can be highly predicted by 
overall brain size. Put another way, mammalian brains appear to scale in a highly coordinated fashion. 
These highly predictable relationships between the sizes of major brain structures indicate that diverse 
brains derive from a highly conserved homeotic starting point. Differences across species stem from 
alterations in global proliferative processes: heterochronic changes in the duration and/or rate of 
neurogenesis that result in linked regularities among brain structures. This suggests that restricted phases of 
neurogenesis are not independently under selective pressures. Further evidence to support this possibility 
stems from the striking finding that the order of neurogenesis —the order in which neuronal populations 
give rise to various brain structures – appears to be highly conserved across species (reviewed in Finlay et 
al., in press). During neurogenesis, many progenitor cells continue dividing symmetrically, producing one 
postmitotic cell and one progenitor cell. Thus, the pool of progenitor cells grows exponentially. This 
suggests that later generated structures will get proportionally larger, largely as a consequence of the 
exponential nature of symmetric cell division, as indeed the linked regularities discussed above confirm. 
That is, Finlay and Darlington (1995) found that greater durations of neurogenesis were correlated with a 
proportional increase in overall brain size and differential effects on the size of brain components, with 
later generated structures growing in a predicable fashion. As Finlay and Darlington (1995) put it, late 
makes large.  
 
2.3 Heterochrony, Segmental Models, and the Deep Structure of Development 
Given the coordinated, predictable shift in relative neural structures, a key concept that emerges is that of 
heterochrony, the phylogenetic variation in the relative timing of major developmental events (for a recent 
review of the notion of heterochrony, see Gould, 2000). Does the fact that heterochronic changes in the 
duration of neurogenesis result in the coordinated pattern of brain size across a variety of mammalian 
species reflect something about the deep structure of development? These linked regularities might indeed 
reflect a deeper structure of development, whereby the highly conserved order of neurogenesis reflects the 
spatial organization of the neuroaxes of the neural tube, a highly conserved organization that likely 
precedes vertebrates. One of the most important insights from the molecular genetics of development 
regards the fact that conserved regulatory genes have highly restricted spatial patterns of activity, 
 
 
 
underlying the segmental patterning of body plans. Segmentation is best understood in Drosophilia, where 
the basic segmented body plan is specified by positional information laid down in the early embryo by an 
interacting group of regulatory genes (reviewed in Pick, 1998; for a computational analysis, see Reinitz et 
al., 1998). Under the sequential, hierarchical action of these genes, the embryo is subdivided into 
increasingly specified body regions along the anterior-posterior axis. Morphogenesis is thus specified by a 
progressively restricted subdivision of the embryo, including the action of homeotic genes that assign an 
identity to established regions.  
 
The central nervous system is composed of four major subdivisions: the spinal cord, hindbrain, midbrain, 
and forebrain. The forebrain (prosencephalon) mediates most higher cognitive functions, and includes such 
structures as neocortex, archicortex, and thalamus. The forebrain was long thought to be an exception to 
segmental models, as its topography appeared non-segmental, making it unclear how topographically 
organized developmental programs would operate. Rubenstein and colleagues (Rubenstein et al., 1994) 
suggested that the vertebrate forebrain does follow a segmental model, and postulated that dorsoventral 
(D/V) and anteroposterior (A/P) patterning mechanisms subdivide the embryonic forebrain into 
longitudinal and transverse domains. According to their prosomeric model, the embryonic forebrain is a 
neuromeric structure subdivided into a grid-like pattern of histogenic domains defined by longitudinal and 
transverse boundaries, and so follows many of the deep developmental themes found in other segmental 
models.  
 
Recently, Finlay et al. (1998; 1999) examined whether there was any relation between the conserved 
ordered of neurogenesis and the prosomeric model of brain organization. They found a strong relationship 
between position on the prosomeric axes and duration of neurogenesis. Specifically, more ventral and 
anterior regions have a more protracted period of neurogenesis, illustrating that the coordinated scaling of 
the relative size of brain structures is in part a reflection of the spatial organization of the neuraxes. This 
suggests that the range of permissible changes to the relative size of brain structures must reflect this deep 
structure of neural development. In particular, the exponential growth of neocortex relative to the rest of the 
brain may therefore be in part a consequence of its prosomeric location. 
 
3. From Modules to Behavioral Systems: The Hierarchical Organization of Behavior and its 
Evolution  
 
3.1 Common Nervous System Design Principles 
The above considerations demonstrate that it is infeasible to view the neocortex as a collection of relatively 
autonomous modules. Rather, evolutionary changes in neural structures involve heterochronic alterations to 
developmental programs that result in systemic changes throughout the brain. As Finlay et al., (in press) 
state, “natural selection does not do its work on some equipotent substrate, but on a complex mechanism 
with a history of previous change that makes some adaptations more "workable" than others.” For these 
reasons, an analysis of the neural mediation of behavior, and the evolutionary paths available to alter such 
structures, requires abandoning a modular, trait atomistic view of the human cognitive architecture. In its 
place, I outline a model that is consistent with the results presented above. Specifically, I present a 
behavioral systems model that regards the brain as a hierarchical control structure, where this hierarchical 
organization is evident both developmentally and evolutionarily. This behavioral systems model places a 
premium on the complex interaction between developmental mechanisms and a structured environment, 
and, therefore, rests on the second component of developmental evolutionary psychology, namely 
developmental cognitive neuroscience. 
 
 The existence of highly conserved nervous system developmental mechanisms suggests that nervous 
systems, despite their apparent diversity, share a deep structure, or common design principles, just as the 
fact that two million distinct species share only 35 major body plans suggest that body plans share many 
common design principles. Even the simplest motile organisms require control structures to regulate goal-
directed behavior necessary for survival in a variable environment (for discussion, see Allman, 1999). For 
example, although the bacterium E. coli does not possess a nervous system, it does possess control 
 
 
 
structures for sensory responses, memory, and motility that underlie its capacity to alter behavior in 
response to environmental conditions. The capacity to approach nutritive stimuli and avoid aversive stimuli 
in the maintenance of life history functions is the hallmark of behavioral systems across phyla. Whereas 
chemotaxis in bacteria involves a single step from sensory transduction to motor behavior, some 
multicellular organisms embody control structures that involve intercellular communication via hormonal 
signaling, while others possess nervous systems with control structures that add layers of mediating control 
between sensory transduction and motor behavior.  
 
There are several alternative design possibilities for biological control structures. One is to make a closed 
system, in the sense of linking fixed behavioral patterns between internal goal states and their 
environmental targets. Although there are many examples of this strategy (Gallistel, 1992), there are more 
powerful and flexible control structures. One such strategy involves leaving the path from internal goal 
state to target state open and discoverable via learning. Principal among this latter design strategy are 
reinforcement-based systems that are capable of learning an environment’s reward structure.5  
 
3.2 The Ubiquity of Reward Structures in Nervous Systems 
A variety of experimental techniques, ranging from psychopharmacology to neural imaging, has 
demonstrated the striking ubiquity and conservation of reward structures across species. At virtually all 
levels of the human nervous system, for example, reward systems can be found that play a central role in 
goal-directed behavior (Schultz, 2000). Here, I focus on one such system, the midbrain dopamine system 
(Figure 1). The midbrain dopamine system projects principally from the ventral tegmental area to the 
nucleus accumbens and the temporal and frontal cortex. Studies utilizing self-stimulation paradigms 
revealed that activation of this system was highly reinforcing, often with laboratory animals preferring to 
self-stimulate this system than eat or copulate with a receptive partner (reviewed in Wise, 1996). Most 
addictive substances involve this system, giving rise to the hedonic theory of dopamine as the signal 
underlying pleasure (though see Garris et al., 1999).  
 
Given what I have previously stated regarding the possibility that control structures are highly conserved, it 
is interesting to note, as Figure 1 illustrates, the striking homology between the dopamine system in 
humans and a reward system in the bumblebee. The bumblebee suboesophogeal ganglion contains an 
identified neuron, VUMmx1, which delivers information about reward during classical conditioning 
experiments via the neurotransmitter, octopamine, which is similar in molecular structure to dopamine 
(Hammer, 1993).  
 
Both experimental and computational work on the role of VUMmx1 in bumblebee foraging has provided 
important insights into the signal carried by octopamine and the system’s functional significance (Real, 
1991; Montague et al., 1995). Rather than simply carrying information regarding reward, it appears that 
octopamine signals information regarding prediction errors. Whereas reward is traditionally a behavioral 
notion, prediction is a computational notion. The difference between certain rewarding outcomes and their 
predictions can be used to guide adaptive behavior. A system that learns through prediction learning need 
not have the path from goal to reward specified, in contrast to fixed behavioral patterns, such as stimulus-
response learning. Instead, the path from goals to rewards may be left open and discoverable via learning, 
resulting in flexible action. Evolution, then, may shape the pattern of basic rewards animals are motivated 
to obtain, but the behavioral path is left open to discovery, as are more complex relations among predictors. 
In this sense, brains are prediction machines that use information gathered from past experience to predict 
future events important for survival (reviewed in Montague and Quartz, 1999).  
 
Experiments utilizing neurophysiological recording in behaving monkeys by Schultz and colleagues 
demonstrate that the midbrain dopamine system plays an important role in prediction learning in the 
mammalian brain (Schultz et al., 1993). When these monkeys were presented with various appetitive 
stimuli, dopaminergic neurons responded with short, phasic activations, which typically lasted for only a 
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of target states that have intrinsic reward value to the organism (classically known as unconditional 
stimulus). 
 
 
 
few repeated presentations. In an important finding, however, Schultz and colleagues found that when the 
rewarding stimuli was preceded by an auditory or visual cue, dopamine neurons changed their time of 
activation to just after the time of cue onset. In contrast, when the reward did not follow the conditioned 
stimulus, dopamine neurons were depressed below their basal firing rate exactly at the time the reward 
should have occurred. These results indicate that the dopamine signal encodes expectations regarding the 
delivery of reward. That is, the output of dopamine neurons code for an error between the actual reward 
received and predictions of the time and magnitude of reward. Like the octopamine signal in the 
bumblebee, the dopamine signal codes a prediction error that can be used in learning and in action 
selection. This mode of action is equivalent to Temporal Difference learning, a thoroughly examined form 
of reinforcement learning (Sutton and Barto, 1998) that learns the predictive structure of an environment. 
Simulations demonstrate that despite the apparent simplicity of this model, it is a very powerful learner, 
capable of learning master level backgammon, for example (Tesauro, 1995). 
 
A variety of evidence supports the notion that this system works in a similar fashion in humans (though it is 
important to point out that this in no way is meant to be the exclusive locus of behavioral choice).  For 
example, it is possible to design reward functions where the computational model of dopamine will pursue 
sub-optimal strategies. Montague and Quartz (1999) found that human choice behavior in a simple two-
card task followed these sub-optimal strategies when faced with these anomalous reward functions.  Berns 
et al (2001) have recently examined prediction learning directly with functional imaging, essentially 
replicating Schultz’s monkey experiments in humans, and have found activation of the midbrain dopamine 
system. These results suggest that the midbrain reward system in the human brain shares common 
functional properties with homologous reward systems across a diverse array of species.  
 
3.3 The Hierarchical Structure of the Human Behavioral System 
It is deeply intriguing to note where the midbrain dopamine system projects to in the human brain. In 
particular, what is most intriguing is the fact that it projects to dorsolateral prefrontal, premotor, and 
parietal cortex, which are structures believed to mediate goal representations, and the orbitofrontal cortex, 
which is believed to mediate the representation of relative reward value and reward expectation (for a 
review, see Schultz, 2000). A great deal of attention has centered on the dorsolateral and orbitofrontal 
prefrontal cortex as structures implicated in crucial components of human cognition, particularly social 
cognition and theory of mind (Stone et al., 1998), symbolic learning (Deacon, 1997), representations of self 
(Craik et al., 1999), and executive function and behavioral inhibition (Norman & Shallice, 1986).  
In an evolutionary context, it is important to ask, what is the functional significance of the fact that a 
phylogenetically old part of the brain projects to a relatively phylogenetic newcomer? According to the 
view of developmental evolutionary psychology, these structures constitute a hierarchically organized 
control structure, where additional layers of control have been added to the evolutionarily conserved 
dopamine system and where this hierarchical organization is evident developmentally as well. To see how, 
it is important to examine the developmental links between these components, as I explore in more detail 
below.  
 
Diamond and colleagues (reviewed in Diamond, 1998) have demonstrated that a functional midbrain 
dopaminergic system is necessary for normal development of prefrontal functions. The most compelling 
evidence regarding this developmental dependence stems from studies of Phenylketonuria (PKU).  Patients 
suffering from PKU do not naturally produce  a particular enzyme, phenylalanine hydroxylase, which 
converts the essential amino acid phenylalanine to another amino acid, tyrosine, the precursor of dopamine; 
when untreated, PKU leads to severe mental retardation. Diamond and colleagues found that lowered levels 
of tyrosine uniquely affect the cognitive functions dependent on prefrontal cortex because of the special 
sensitivity of prefrontally projecting dopamine neurons to small decreases in tyrosine. In a 4-year 
longitudinal study, they found that PKU children performed worse than matched controls, their own 
siblings, and children from the general population on tasks that required the working memory and 
inhibitory control abilities dependent on dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. In contrast, these PKU children 
performed well on control tasks that were not mediated by prefrontal cortex (Diamond et al., 1997).  
The hierarchical organization of the control structures that constitute the human cognitive architecture is 
apparent developmentally, with human cognition and behavior becoming increasingly mediated by frontal 
structures. In contrast to the early functional involvement of midbrain dopamine systems, prefrontal 
 
 
 
structures develop relatively late and exhibit a protracted development that continues into adolescence. 
Thus, behavior and cognition increasingly comes under the mediation of frontal structures from subcortical 
structures across development, a process sometimes referred to as frontalization of behavior (Rubia et al., 
2000). For example, executive function is a control mechanism that guides, coordinates, and updates 
behavior in a flexible fashion, particularly in novel or complex tasks (Norman and Shallice, 1986). This 
requires that information related to behavioral goals be actively represented and maintained so that these 
representations may guide behavior toward goal-directed activities. In humans, executive function follows 
a special developmental trajectory, reflecting an evolutionary reorganization of prefrontal structures and 
their development. Between 7 ½ and 12 months of age, infants show a developmental progresson on A-not-
B (Diamond, 1985), delayed response (Diamond and Doar, 1989), and object retrieval tasks (Diamond, 
1988). There is substantial evidence that these tasks are mediated by dorsolateral prefrontal cortex and rely 
on working memory, neural representations of goal-related information, and behavioral inhibition 
(Goldman-Rakic, 1990; Petrides, 1995). Further, various sources of evidence indicate that dopamine is 
necessary for successful performance on these tasks (Sawaguchi and Goldman-Rakic, 1994). 
 
3.4 Computational Links 
Although there is strong evidence that an intact dopamine system is necessary for the developmental 
emergence of prefrontal functions, a largely unresolved question concerns the specific nature of this 
developmental link. One particularly intriguing possibility is that the dopamine signal serves as a learning 
signal that guides the construction of prefrontal structures during development. Computational work on the 
midbrain dopamine system suggests such a learning role with strong analogies to temporal difference 
learning, a form of reinforcement learning (Sutton & Barto, 1998). A key notion underlying reinforcement 
learning is that of learning through interacting with one’s environment. For example, a major source of 
knowledge stems from an infant’s interactions with its environment, which produces a wealth of 
information about cause and effect, about the consequences of actions, and about what to do in order to 
achieve goals —all without the need for an explicit teacher. Of course, Piaget also emphasized the central 
importance of the developing child’s agency and active exploration with its environment in his 
constructivist theory of cognitive development.  
 
Learning through interacting with one’s environment requires structures that direct the system to its 
environment. According to the view I have been outlining here, this is mediated in part by the midbrain 
dopamine system. One clue for this role derives from studies of the neurobiology of personality, which 
view personality as deriving from motivational systems. From this perspective, the midbrain dopamine 
system constitutes a behavioral facilitation system that underlies fundamental properties of personality, 
specifically extraversion and positive emotionality (Depue & Collins, 1999). From a developmental 
perspective, this behavioral facilitation system appears to be operative at an early age and likely underlies 
major dimensions of temperament, along with other diffuse ascending systems, such as noradernergic and 
serotonergic systems. Thus, given this system’s computational properties and its role as a behavioral 
facilitation system early in postnatal development, this system is ideally situated to be involved in the 
reinforcement or self-supervised construction of prefrontal structures underlying complex behavioral 
control.  
 
This computational role can be illustrated by comparing reinforcement models of learning to models of 
self-organization, or unsupervised learning. The best-known account of unsupervised learning is Hebbian 
learning, which in its simplest form is: 
 
))()()( txtytw jkkj h=D                                                            (1) 
 
where a synaptic weight wkj of neuron k with presynaptic and postsynaptic signals denoted by xj and yk 
respectively are altered at time step t and where h is a positive constant that determines the rate of learning. 
Algorithms such as equation 1 and a variety of modifications essentially find efficient representations of 
salient environmental information by implementing such data reduction strategies as principal component 
analysis. Such algorithms can be mo dified to become reinforcement learning algorithms by making weight 
 
 
 
updates dependent on the Hebbian correlation of a prediction error and the presynaptic activity at the 
previous timestep. This takes the following form: 
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where x(i, t – 1) represents presynaptic activity at connection i and time t – 1, h is a learning rate, and w(i, t 
–1)prev is the previous value of the weight representing timestep t – 1. The term d(t) is a prediction error 
term (see Figure 2) and is the difference between a prediction of reward and the actual reward, represented 
as the output of the dopaminergic projection to cortex in the simulation framework. The addition of this 
term changes the Hebbian framework to a Predictive Hebbian one (Montague & Sejnowski, 1994) and is 
the essential computed differential in the temporal differences method of reinforcement learning (Sutton & 
Barto, 1998) with close connections to dynamic programming (Bellman, 1957). 
 
The developmental link between the midbrain dopamine system and prefrontal structures suggests that an 
explicit account of the developmental trajectory of cognitive skills is necessary; an account based on 
innately-specified modules is inadequate. According to this view, complex developmental skills decompose 
into developmental precursors, which may often be mediated by structures that are distinct from those 
mediating the mature state. For example, face processing is believed to be mediated by subcortical 
structures during early postnatal development, but it subsequently shifts to cortical sites (reviewed in 
Johnson, 1997). The model I have outlined above suggests a possible way of bootstrapping a system into 
such complex representations by biasing development by making the system selectively attentive to faces. 
An economical means of implementing such a strategy would be by making faces, or primitive template 
representations of them, rewarding to the system, thereby designing a system that preferentially attends to 
faces. It is clear that human infants possess such behavioral biases, which may be implemented through 
projections to midbrain dopamine systems that constitute unconditioned stimuli. 
 
3.5 Protracted Development and Constructive Learning 
These considerations suggest another important evolutionary alteration to developmental programs with 
important consequence for the evolution of human cognition. Above I highlighted evolutionary alterations 
in the duration of neurogenesis that appears to account for many aspects of increases in brain size. In 
addition, it appears that the human brain’s development is also more protracted than other anthropoid apes. 
For example, the chimpanzee brain reaches 95% of its final mass by age two, whereas the human brain 
does not reach this milestone until the age of five. On many accounts, the protracted nature of human 
development has mainly negative consequences, such as extending the period of heightened vulnerability. 
Such accounts often regard protracted human development as a side effect of the constraints bipedalism 
placed on the design of the female pelvis, and thus on limits to the size of the birth canal.  
 
The interpretation of protracted development as a liability stems in part from a view of development as 
largely a process of intrinsic maturation. Protracted neural development need not be viewed simply as a 
cost to the organism. Instead, under certain conditions extending development can result in powerful 
learning strategies. There are two requirements: first, development must not be simply a process of intrinsic 
maturation. Instead, it must be sensitive to environmental structure, in that activity emanating from the 
environment must play a role in the construction of neural circuits. Second, this developmental strategy can 
be enhanced if neural development is not concurrent across different regions of the cortex, but instead 
follows a hierarchical scheme. Viewed instead as a kind of learning, its protractedness takes on special, 
positive qualities. In previous work I outlined a view I refer to as neural constructivism whereby the 
functional properties of cortex are built from the dynamic interaction between neural growth mechanisms 
and environmentally-derived neural activity, acting hierarchically at the regional level and with high 
specificity at the cellular level (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997; Quartz, 1999). Neural constructivism suggests 
that the interaction between processes traditionally described cognitively as learning interact in complex 
ways with their neural substrates to construct neural circuits. 
 
The starting point for this work was an investigation into the relationship between developing neural 
structures and the learning properties of cortex. Since its beginnings, developmental neurobiology has been 
 
 
 
embroiled in debate over whether development is a progressive increase in neural structures or whether it 
essentially involves a selective elimination of exuberant structures (see Purves et al., 1996 for a summary 
of this debate). As this question has important consequences for the learning properties of cortex, I 
examined the developmental time course of synaptic numbers, axonal processes, and dendritic arbors and 
concluded that the bulk of the evidence favors progressive increases in these measures during development. 
In addition, I reviewed neurobiological results spanning over thirty years that support the role for activity-
dependent mechanisms in the progressive construction of neural circuits. On the basis of this work, I 
suggested that cortical development is not characterized by an early overproduction of neural elements 
followed by selective elimination, nor is it one exhausted by mechanisms of selective elimination operating 
on transient, exuberant structures. Rather, neural development during the acquisition of major cognitive 
skills is best characterized as a progressive construction of neural structures, in which environmentally-
derived activity plays a role in the construction of neural circuits. This revised view of the role of activity in 
the construction of neural circuits forms the basis for neural constructivism, From the perspective of 
cognitive development, I suggested that this far-reaching interaction between neural growth and 
environmentally-derived neural activity undermined the distinction between biological maturation and 
learning. In place of this dichotomy, I articulated a theory of “constructive learning” and suggested that it 
possesses more powerful acquisition properties than traditional accounts of cognitive development 
assumed. 
 
In more recent work (Quartz, 1999; Quartz & Sejnowski, 2000) I have investigated the implications of two 
important advances for neural constructivism. Recent longitudinal studies of brain development using MRI 
have demonstrated pre-adolescent increases in cortical gray matter in all cortical lobes (Giedd et al., 1999; 
Thompson et al., 2000). In addition, this growth is heterochronic; that is, regions of cortex develop at 
different rates (Thompson et al., 2000). This is extremely significant for theories of cognitive development 
for the following reason. Although many features of Piaget’s developmental view have come under 
extensive criticism, the core idea that development involves the expansion of hierarchically organized 
sequential operations, beginning with perceptual and sensorimotor functions and becoming more 
combinatorially complex, remains popular. These studies and others suggest that the brain develops 
hierarchically, with early sensory regions developing prior to more complex representations in association 
areas (Quartz, 1999). Given the influence of activity in this construction, it suggests a powerful hierarchical 
construction process whose acquisition properties remain essentially unanalyzed. Although MRI studies 
lack the spatial resolution to identify the cellular components of neuropil – neural processes and non-
neuronal cells, or glia – responsible for increases in cortical gray matter, recent advances in microscopy 
that allow the continuous monitoring of cellular components at high resolution (Maletic-Savatic et al., 
1999; Engert & Bonhoeffer, 1999; reviewed in Wong and Wong, 2000) have revealed a highly dynamic 
view of development at the cellular level. In particular, these studies demonstrate that activity is not simply 
permissive in its regulation of development. Rather, temporally correlated activity between pre- and post-
synaptic elements that induces long-term potentiation results in the local sprouting of dendritic elements, in 
agreement with Hebb’s original postulate in its developmental context (Hebb, 1949). These results are 
highly significant for theories of cognitive development, as they indicate that environmentally-derived 
patterned neural activity plays an instructive role in the construction of neural circuits, both within 
unsupervised and self-supervised modes. 
 
Although prefrontal function has traditionally been most closely associated with purely cognitive functions, 
its central involvement in social cognition has become increasingly apparent in recent years. Indeed, one 
potential reason for protracted development lies in the difficulty of developing the social competence 
necessary for complex social life. There is now good evidence to indicate that one component of social 
competence, theory of mind, depends at least in part on the appropriate social exposure for its development, 
as many deaf children show delays on theory of mind tasks (Peterson & Siegal, 1995; Russell et al., 1998). 
This is believed to be due to the fact that parents of deaf children are typically naïve signers, and so 
household social interactions are limited by communicative ability.  
 
Human social behavior becomes increasingly sophisticated over the developmental timecourse. In 
particular, over development individuals become increasingly skilled at reading subtle social cues and 
adjusting their behavior accordingly by applying appropriate behavioral schemes and norms to rapidly 
shifting contexts. Increasingly mature forms of social cognition involve a cognitive flexibility and the 
 
 
 
ability to match behavioral strategies with the contingencies of various situations. The developmental 
frontalization of behavior that underlies these capacities reflects a process I have referred to previously as 
progressive externalization (Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997). Progressive externalization refers to the process 
whereby neural development becomes regulated by environmental influences over longer periods of 
postnatal exposure. This emphasis on behavioral plasticity contrasts with the emphasis on evolutionarily-
encoded behavioral strategies. Under what conditions did such capacities emerge? 
  
4. The Adaptive History of Hominid Evolution: Rethinking the Environment of Evolutionary 
Adaptation 
4.1 Beyond Directional Selection 
A crucial assumption of any evolutionary psychology integrative approach is that human cognitive and 
behavioral capacities reflect our lineage’s history. Without this assumption, there would be little impetus to 
understand the relationship between evolution and psychology. An analysis of the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation (EEA) plays an especially prominent role in narrow evolutionary psychology, as its 
adaptive thinking places a premium on inferring the mind’s Darwinian algorithms from the nature of the 
enduring challenges confronting our ancestors.  
 
The most prominent scenarios of hominid adaptation are habitat-specific. That is, a specific, stable 
ecological context is typically identified as the EEA. The most popular such account is the savanna 
hypothesis, according to which our ancestors lived as hunter-gatherers on the African savanna. According 
to some interpretations of this EEA, the ecological challenges confronting our ancestors were relatively 
minor, making the social environment the primary selective force, where a Machiavellian intelligence was 
most adaptive.  
 
The notion that the EEA was characterized by a stable ecological context is complicated by recent work in 
paleoclimatology. Through painstaking analysis of ice cores, deep ocean cores, and land and lake 
sediments, climate scientists are piecing together a surprising his tory of the earth’s climate (for a review, 
see Potts, 1996; Bradley, 1999). This research reveals that the last million years was a time of jarring 
climatic changes, the greatest period of climatic fluctuation since Lucy walked the planet 3.5 million years 
ago, and could be the period of the greatest climatic fluctuations ever registered on the planet. Often within 
the span of a decade, climates underwent dramatic alterations, from rain forest to arid savanna to steppe. 
The pressures ecological instability placed on species is evident by the pronounced reduction in 
biodiversity during this period, particularly with regard to species that were highly specialized for particular 
ecologies (Potts, 1996). 
 
The notion of a long enduring EEA that remained stable enough for its problems to act on hominids over an 
evolutionary timescale is also complicated by the fact that for most of hominid evolution there was a statis 
in relative brain size. Indeed, between 1.8 and .6 million years ago, the brain scaled essentially as a 
straightforward function of body mass. Hominid encephalization appears to have occurred mostly within 
the last 600,000 years (Ruff et al., 1997). 
 
It is intriguing to note that this fairly recent process of encephalization coincided with the period of 
unprecedented climatic instability I mentioned above. Although ecological instability certainly does not 
exclude a wide variety of enduring problems that likely remained stable across varying climes, it suggests 
that solutions to such problems alone cannot account for the evolution of human cognition. Rather, it 
suggests that human cognitive evolution was driven in part by environmental variance and the challenges 
such instability presented. This suggests a basic adjustment in how we ought to view the evolutionary 
pressures that helped shape human cognition. There are two possible responses to ecological instability. A 
species may attempt to track its preferred habitat, as appears to have been the case with chimpanzees, who 
might have taken shelter in rain forest refugia during glacial periods. An alternative response is open to 
those species that possess enough behavioral flexibility to adapt to differing ecological contexts. Potts 
(1996) contrasts the selective pressure of adapting to multiple ecological contexts, a pressure he refers to as 
 
 
 
variability selection, with the more traditional notion of directional selection, and suggests that variability 
selection was a major force in human origins.  
 
5.Progressive  Externalization and The Ontogenic Role of Culture  
 
5.1 The Progressive Externalization of Development 
This perspective places a premium on behavioral flexibility. I have suggested that this behavioral flexibility 
is mediated by a human cognitive architecture that is a hierarchically-organized control structure, and 
which displays a developmental trajectory whereby behavior is increasingly mediated by prefrontal 
structures. Based on an increased encephalization, which appears to be a fairly recent process, it appears to 
be the product of heterochronic alterations in development that result in both increased neocortical volume 
and protracted development, reflecting a process I have referred to as progressive externalization.  
Ecological instability suggests another possible response: the construction of buffers that make one less 
vulnerable to the immediate environment. One such buffer is novel forms of social organization, and 
ultimately symbolic culture. The cognitive structures that I have emphasized in developmental evolutionary 
psychology’s model of the human cognitive architecture are those necessary for complex social life and 
symbolic culture. The process of progressive externalization, mediated in part by heterochronic changes in 
neural development, whereby the development of cognitive structures became increasingly dependent on 
prolonged environmental interaction, may thus have been the route to designing a cognitive architecture 
capable of the highly flexible and context -sensitive behavior necessary for participation in a complex 
culture. Symbolic culture, then, plays a central role in constructing the structures that make it possible. 
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Jackie Sullivan 
 
 
Dr. Quartz offers two criticisms of “narrow evolutionary psychology”.  He states, first, that even if 
cognitive functions can be detected behaviorally, this does not entail that they correspond to distinct brain 
structures.  Furthermore, even if brain functions can be localized, it does not follow that each identified 
function corresponds to a separate gene.  This general strategy of critique is familiar, as it  resembles 
criticisms of adaptive explanations for traits: even if traits can be identified, this does not entail they were 
selected for independently.  
 
In place of “narrow evolutionary psychology” he offers an alternative positive developmental evolutionary 
psychology.  In articulating this view, he attends to two specific questions: 
 
(1) In an individual’s lifetime, how do higher cognitive functions get “built up”?  In other words, what 
are the mechanisms by which higher cognitive functions get “built up”? 
(2) How was the program to build up cognitive functions selected for in the course of evolutionary 
history? 
 
My commentary is directed primarily at analyzing the answers that he provides to these two questions and 
identifying some specific problems with these answers that I believe put into question the viability of the 
alternative he offers.   
 
II.  Developmental Account   
 
One crucial element of the developmental account is that the human brain undergoes a protracted course of 
development in so far as cortical growth occurs during an extended timeframe.  One feature of this 
extended period of development is that specific subcortical structures that are operative early in embryonic 
development play an essential role in determining the course of later cortical growth and development.  Dr. 
Quartz isolates one primary subcortical neurotransmitter system that he deems crucial to determining how 
the developmental trajectory of the cortex will unfold, namely, the midbrain dopamine system. He provides 
what I take to be a two-step analysis of this system.   
 
First he tells us about information-processing features of dopamine neurons, based on data that suggests the 
specific kinds of information these neurons themselves encode and the type of learning mediated by the 
system as a whole.  This data is taken from Wolfram Schultz’s single-unit recording work on dopamine 
neurons in alert behaving monkeys. The data suggests that the dopamine system functions primarily as a 
reward or “pleasure seeking” system and, more specifically, that dopamine neurons encode information 
concerning (1) the relationship between stimuli and rewards as well as (2) expectations regarding the 
delivery of reward.  On the basis of this evidence, Dr. Quartz characterizes the dopamine system as an  
“open biological control system”, in so far as it leaves the path from internal goal states to target states 
open and discoverable via learning” (Quartz 2002, 15), which he claims enables flexible action.  
 
Once he specifies the function of the dopamine system as a reward system, he isolates it as the primary 
system upon which a variety of cortical areas are built up. I take his hierarchical cognitive developmental 
story in a nutshell to run as follows:   
  
(1) In the early stages of development, the system directs the infant to interact with its 
environment, enabling it to develop associations between rewards and goals.   
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(2) Due to these goal-directed interactions with the environment, activity-dependent cortical 
growth and activity-dependent changes in synaptic strength occur.  This use-dependent 
activity in conjunction with specific neuronal growth mechanisms results in flexible learning 
and is indeed essential to such learning. 
 
(3) The cortical areas to which the dopamine system projects appear to realize their cognitive 
functions based on this early goal-seeking behavior.   
 
 
While the specific details of this story are far more complex, this reconstruction is sufficient for the 
particular criticism I wish to make.  The main point of this reconstruction is to emphasize just how much of 
Dr. Quartz’s neuroconstructive cognitive account is hinging on the dopamine system.  Now let me turn to 
the data Dr. Quartz uses to support his claims.   
 
Schultz’s single-unit recording work in behaving monkeys is suggestive in establishing a role for dopamine 
neurons in reinforcement and prediction learning.  This does not establish, however, what role these 
neurons play in mediating the types of learning associated with those cortical areas to which the dopamine 
system projects.  As far as I understand the story, it is unclear what inputs to layer V pyramidal cells 
dopaminergic neurons are mediating. Knowing this is crucial to establishing just how it happens that these 
systems are “built up” via the dopamine system. 
 
Now, one can cite evidence from developmental studies that implicates the dopamine system in the 
development of cortical areas subserving specific “higher-order” cognitive functions. Dr. Quartz employs 
this strategy in asking us to consider the case study of phenylketonuria (PKU).  Patients with PKU have 
deficits in working memory and inhibitory control abilities, which are thought to result due to a lack of the 
enzyme phenylalanine hydroxylase, which converts phenylalanine to tyrosine, a precursor of dopamine.  
The specific pathway implicated in this disease is the projection from dopamine neurons to dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex.  Based on this and similar evidence, Dr. Quartz wants to establish the fundamental role of 
dopamine in the realization of cognitive functions in this area of cortex.    
 
Now, it is interesting and quite relevant to note that tyrosine hydroxylase is a precursor not only for 
dopamine, but also for all catecholamine neurotransmitters, including norepinephrine and epinephrine.  In 
other words, if one does not naturally produce the enzyme that converts phenlalanine hydroxylase to 
tyrosine, he/she lacks all of the catecholamine neurotransmitters. Presumably in PKU patients, these 
neurotransmitter systems are similarly affected.  In turn, it seems reasonable to argue that it is not 
dopaminergic projections to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex alone that are responsible for the production 
of the types of cognitive deficits that we see in PKU patients.  In other words, the explanation as to why we 
see these cognitive deficits in PKU patients is probably far more complicated than Dr. Quartz leads us to 
believe. I want to suggest that this puts into question the fundamental role he assigns to the dopamine 
system as the primary base upon which higher-order cognitive functions are built-up.    
 
The moral of the story is that when we individuate distinct neurotransmitter systems and attempt to isolate 
how they function developmentally as “behavioral control structures”, we might miss how these distinct 
systems act in concert in the process of what Dr. Quartz terms “hierarchical cognitive development”.  My 
worry is that if we begin with incomplete or fragmented developmental stories, in so far as we prematurely 
assign functions to specific brain areas without considering how they interact with other areas to enable 
cognitive functions, we wind up telling similarly fragmented adaptationist stories, which make it unclear as 
to how much better off we are than the “narrow evolutionary psychologist”.  In fact, we may only better off 
in so far as we are taking our analysis one step lower and beginning to look at the biology.  Yet this 
introduces a specific element of complexity.  Dr. Quartz certainly appreciates this complexity, but the 
question is: how might it be worked into his current account?   
 
This second criticism regarding the evolutionary story that Dr. Quartz articulates is based on a specific 
tension that I find with respect to his position on the units upon which selection can act.  At one point in the 
paper he suggests that selection can act potentially upon phylogenetic variations in heterochrony, namely, 
 
 
 
variations in the trajectory of “developmental programs” that coordinate brain development.  However, he 
also seems to suggest that selection can act upon variations in biological control structures, the dopamine 
system being one instance of a biological control structure.  To get clear on the tension, allow me to very 
briefly restate Dr. Quartz’s adaptationist account.   
 
 
III. Evolutionary Account 
 
Dr. Quartz first suggests that selection can potentially act upon heterochrony, namely, phylogenetic 
variation in the relative timing of major developmental events. Such phylogenetic variations in the 
trajectory of developmental programs correspond to specific mechanis ms--arrays of regulatory genes, or 
genomic regulatory systems.  In humans, the duration of neurogenesis in the course of a lifetime is 
protracted, this protraction to some extent mirrors the spatial organization of the neuraxes of the neural tube 
from which the nervous system develops.   
 
During the last 600,000 years, a period of enduring ecological instability occurred.  The dopamine system 
was an evolutionary precursor to specific cortical regions, so at some point in this timeframe it was already 
on-line. This period of ecological instability coincided roughly with hominid encephalization, namely, (1) 
the development of higher cortical structures situated at the anterior and ventral ends of the neuraxis as well 
as (2) the protracted development of these structures.   
 
Dr. Quartz’s claim is that selection acted upon heterochrony, and progressively more and more layers of 
cortical control were added on top of the subcortical dopamine system, the dopamine system playing a 
crucial role in their development mu ch like the role it plays more modernly in cognitive development. The 
entire system evolved to comprise a hierarchical control structure that bestowed upon the species increased 
flexibility for dealing with an ever-changing environment.   
 
A tension in this story arises, at least in my mind, because it appears that the dopamine system as a 
behavioral control system was selected for prior to the selection of the developmental program.  A plausible 
adaptationist account may be offered as to why the dopamine system was selected for; indeed this account 
appears to be implicit in Dr. Quartz’s story.  My question is whether he maintains that selection acts upon 
what appear to be two distinct kinds of units.   
 
IV. Conclusion 
 
If I am correct with respect to this interpretation, I think there are certain problems for Dr. Quartz’s 
adaptationist account.  He has taken a system and separated it off from other systems that seem equally as 
important to the modern developmental story, and given it pride of place in an evolutionary context in so 
far as establishing a separate heritability for it, and has suggested that it is functioning in a similar way as it 
functions in current development.  Yet, as I mentioned previously, there are variety of systems which 
contribute to higher-order cognitive development currently, these different systems are not all reward 
systems, and how the details of how they interact in concert with the dopamine system in the realization of 
higher-order cognitive functions is not well worked-out. So, in essence my claim is that there is little 
evidential support for the developmental story and this poses a problem for the evolutionary story.  Both 
stories have to be far more complex than Dr. Quartz’s account leads us to believe.   
 
These criticisms aside, I cannot stress enough my sentiments on the value and importance of Dr. Quartz’s 
novel and interesting contributions to this literature.  If we want to move beyond “narrow evolutionary 
psychology”, this is the ultimately the direction in which we want to move and I wholeheartedly thank him 
for setting the ball rolling.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Peter Machamer* 
 
*Many thanks to German Barrionuevo and Floh Thiels for their conversations with me about these topics.  
They are not responsible for the way in which I have used their input. 
 
Quartz argues, I think rightly, that we need to theorize "a neural constructivist approach that adequately 
characterizes activity mediated representation construction." In presenting his view, he argues against a 
modular evolutionary approach, against innate postulations and against a pruning model. 
 
Quartz wants to use a connectionist network model to describe neuronal growth, and he does so by activity 
driven feedback from the environment that strengthens connections.  This he takes to be driven by 
ubiquitous "reward structures", and he focuses on the midbrain dopamine system as exemplary in this 
reward process.  So in discussing the role of VUMmx1 (in bumblebee) he describes the reward system as 
"octopamine signaling information regarding prediction errors", which is the difference between rewarding 
outcomes and expected rewards.  This and like things he takes as evidence that the dopamine signals serves 
as a "learning signal that guides the development of the construction of prefrontal structures during 
development."  He focuses the midbrain dopamine system since it ties to personality and motivation, 
particularly to extraversion and positive emotionality.  So basically it is a reward reinforcement model for 
motivated behavior. 
 
 
In these short comments I will only touch briefly on four points of criticism: 
 
· The strange and straw-man opposition of nature/nurture 
· The fact of pruning. 
· The limited and multi-natured role of the dopamine system. 
· And most bad, it seems  Quartz has committed himself to reintroducing behaviorism in 
learning theory, some 50 years after we thought we had rid ourselves of it. 
 
1) Nature/Nurture 
 
The counter arguments Quartz develops against "nature models" are not detailed enough to be critically 
examined.  But it seems strange in these days of homeobox developmental theory that anyone would set out 
to argue that all development is environmentally controlled.  Quartz mentions the new field of evolutionary 
developmental biology, but then goes on to discuss only "narrow" evolutionary psychology.  He is certainly 
right to focus on development and not to accept the just-so stories of evolutionary psychologists about 
evolutionarily determined modules.  But this does not negate nature.  Many neurons are capable of 
generating spontaneous patterns of electrical activity.  (Cf. Levitan and Kaczmarek, The Neuron)  But even 
given this, there is no one that I have ever read that does not recognize some significance for environmental 
inputs, though often not in the right way; no one who thinks nature is everything.  So who is he arguing 
against, and does he really wish to claim that the total structure of the brain's wiring is environmentally 
controlled?  This would be most strange.  So just who are the bad guys? 
 
2) Pruning is a fact.   
 
Quartz also argues against pruning models.  Maybe, to be charitable, he is only arguing against models that 
claim that pruning is the only way in which learning occurs or the only mechanism by which brain 
structures get organized.  Certainly it is correct to argue against such a strong claim.  But does anyone 
credible ever argue such?  Still, the fact is there is pruning or synapse elimination, and it plays a substantial 
role in developing the structure of the Pre Frontal Cortex (PFC).  
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3) The Dopamine system 
 
It is again hard to get clear on exactly what Quartz's thesis is here.  He keeps using phrases and words such 
as "plays an important role" (17), "serves as a learning signal" (20) "underlies" (20).  But it seems clear he 
means the mid brain dopamine system to be a reinforcement, reward system, complicated by "expectations 
regarding the delivery of the reward" or "difference learning"  (17). 
Now the dopamine system does function sometimes as a reward system, by providing 'pleasure'.  Those 
cocaine addicted self-stimulators do prefer their "kick" to food or sex.  But this is not the dopamine 
system's only function, or, in learning, even its chief function.  The dopamine system also functions in the 
hippocampus to maintain information in working memory.  This seems to be part of the mechanism for 
getting information from the hippocampus into Long term memory.  But in this case it does not function as 
a pleasure giver or reward system. 
  
Further, it would seem that the dopamine reward with pleasure system ought to be given a somewhat 
limited role because, to out it crudely, most things we (or animals learn) are not rewarded, or minimally not 
rewarded in the way that cocaine rewards.  (In fact, this was one aspect of Chomsky's argument against 
Skinner about language learning.) 
 
My second, problem with this account arises from what Quartz is claiming about the ubiquity of the 
dopamine reward system.  There are many other neurotransmitters that are involved in learning and in 
strengthening structural connections among the brain mechanisms.  Some of them are even excitatory.  
GABA is excitatory and favors activation of NMDA receptors in the developing brain, which is a 
mechanism by which STP forms LTP or by which synaptic terminals are stabilized.  One could also talk 
about the role of seratonin.  So why privilege the dopamine system?  Of course, my remarks should not be 
taken to deny the major significance of the dopamine system. 
 
4) Behaviorism 
 
My major problem is that this approach seems to be bringing behaviorism back as the only mechanisms for 
learning.  He says we ought to consider the 'brain as a collection of behavioral systems" (7) Learning is 
either classical conditioning or operant (reward) conditioning (with the expectation error being more 
important that the actual reward, so this differs from Skinner.) but all else is the same.  Even aversive 
conditioning seems to play no role in Quartz's theory (and aversion is not handled through the dopamine 
system.) But more importantly, there are other learning mechanisms that can control and modify internal 
representations through environmental feedback.  The mechanisms by which feedback works are not 
always reward mechanisms.  
 
If one sticks to a theory of all learning as reward reinforcement, one also inherits all the problems that were 
pointed out against Skinner's operant conditioning.  First, as Chomsky pointed out in his review of Verbal 
Behavior in 1959, the vagueness of stimulus generalization (induction), and abstraction make the theory 
uninformative and non-explanatory.  Second, There are the problems of how a reward system selects from 
an impinging array of stimuli and multidimensional stimuli those that it will reward.  And finally, there is 
the problem of the introduction and modification of goal states themselves, how they are determined and 
established.  These are just the major criticisms of the behaviorist program that led to the Cognitive 
Revolution.  I do not believe that Quartz really wants us to return to the "good old behaviorist days". 
 
Further, it is not necessary for a neural network, or PDP computational, system to work on reward.  So if 
his main goal is having a computational system, it need not be implemented by this theoretical strategy.  
Anything as simple as 'fire together, wire together" may work to change probabilities of firing; and more 
complex feedback mechanisms in many ways may change connective probabilities leading to goal states.   
My clinching argument is that if Quartz is right then Cole Porter must be wrong about goals and the 
dopamine system (I get no kick from cocaine, but I get a kick out of you). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Andrea Scarantino 
 
 
Quartz: In response to Sullivan’s comment that the function of the dopamine system may be more 
complex than I have portrayed it, I have to say that I agree: the story is more complicated, we are only 
beginning to understand it. It is in some sense an accident of intellectual history that the dopamine system 
is getting so much attention, partly due to the fact that we have a good understanding of its physiology. 
When the currently investigated interaction of serotonin and dopamine will be better understood, for 
example, we will get a more nuanced story. I think, however, that the basic facts concerning the role of 
dopamine in behavior will stand scrutiny. The traditional view on dopamine, which resulted from 
behaviorist studies of reward, was that dopamine is essentially involved in the hedonic component of 
behavior. But, as Machamer pointed out, dopamine is not only involved in the reward system. One of the 
lessons of computational neurobiology in this regard is that dopamine has a crucial cognitive learning role 
rather than simply a hedonic function (incidentally, it is likely that opiates are more involved than 
dopamine in the hedonic function). What we are learning is the kind of complexity generated by a signal 
such as dopamine being broadcast to various areas of the brain. Ten years ago, before Schultz’s studies 
came to prominence, the thought was that dopamine is not specifically implied in modulation, because as a 
simple scalar signal it was too informationally impoverished. One of great triumphs of the collaboration of 
theoretical neurobiologists and experimentalists has been to show that dopamine can function as a signal 
for prediction error. But this, I have to say in response to Machamer, should not be construed as a return to 
behaviorism (I will get back to this point later). If we want to understand how we interact with our 
environment and how representations are built by taking into account the role of the environment, the 
general view in the connectionist community is that the reinforcement paradigm is the only way to go. 
Machamer: Why? 
Quartz: Other models of learning require a fairly high-level error signal 
Machamer: For simple beings, why doesn’t “firing together wiring together” work? No reinforcement is 
necessary in such cases, you can have learning just in virtue of an association in neural firing. 
Quartz: Well, Hebbian learning for example can give you something (e.g. correlations between pre and 
postsynaptic activity), but you need to add replacement of postsynaptic activity with temporal derivative, 
and use that as a signal for Hebbian learning. Predictive hebbian learning is what you need, moving from 
learning from correlations to something else is what adds computational complexity.  
Machamer: Why stop at reinforcement? There are all kinds of mechanisms that will change the 
connectionist probabilities. 
Quartz: I agree, there are other ways to have learning. Comparative neuro-anatomy shows conservation, 
central components of behaviors are underlined. If we are presented with these systems, how [not 
transcribed] 
Machamer: But still, many types of learning are going on. 
Quartz: I agree, differences in subtypes of dopamine detectors can give us novel ways to use signals. No 
doubt you are right. Also, dopamine is certainly involved in different ways. But dopamine is also what 
catatonic patients lack, and this seems a pretty good clue of their role. Even Cole Porter needs dopamine! 
The physiology of dopamine started being studied because of an interest of its involvement in motor 
behavior. It is now clear that dopamine plays an important role in allowing organisms to predict the 
statistical structure of environment. Measures of complexity: we need to put debate in context of 
computational framework, and understand structural changes for informational processing. Synaptic  
Computational complexity can be served. When we look at plasticity in mature animal, structural change of 
cells seem important for learning.  
 
Quartz: I now want to go back to Machamer’s charge that what I am proposing is ultimately a return to 
behaviorism. What I am actually against is a formalist approach to cognition, based on the idea that 
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cognition - intended as symbol manipulation - can be environment-independent. This idea represented a 
disastrous move of early cognitive science, in that it completely omitted to take into account the interaction 
between organism and environment. The key phenomenon of the environment providing rewards to the 
organism went out of view. The lesson of computational neurobiology is that such rewards can be used to 
build complicated neural representations. In this respect, my project goes against the notorious allergy for 
representation-talk typical of behaviorism. I think there is a false dichotomy in the debate between 
cognitivism and behaviorism, namely the one between reward systems and cognitive representations. The 
real insight comes from doing away with the dichotomy, and appreciating how reward systems underlie the 
very construction of representations. The fact that I want to give pride of place to representations - built on 
the basis of reward systems - is a clear sign of my departure from behaviorism.  
 
 
McClelland: It seems to me that the main point of contention is whether reinforcement learning should 
shoulder the entire explanatory burden. I would like to begin by emphasizing a couple of points of 
agreement between us. The first is that we all seem to endorse an interactionist perspective, according to 
which the interaction of brain areas is fundamental to account for the emergence of complex cognitive 
functions. The second is that there seems to be consensus on the idea that experience is ultimately what 
drives development. The issue is whether or not reinforcement should be the only experience that counts. In 
our work at CMU, we have used learning systems different from reinforcement. We have tried to account 
for the fact that information is contained in the stream of experience, and that what you have experienced 
up to now provides you with a lot of information for predicting the future. Importantly, the domain of 
prediction is not limited to rewards, but extends to events, namely to the whole pattern of future 
involvement of the organism. It gives you a way to predict, as it were, the next input. A number of people, 
for example Oreilly (?), are trying to create prediction error systems that are not strictly reward-dependent. 
I acknowledge the importance of reward learning, but I agree with Sullivan and Machamer that there is 
more than reinforcement learning going on. We should take other forms of learning seriously. 
Schwartz: 
I am also interested in evolutionary developmental approaches.  For instance, in the development of the 
vertebrate tripartite brain, various regulatory molecules are co-opted that are also involved in the formation 
of different features in different kinds of organisms, such as wing spots in butterflies and radial symmetry 
in echinoderms.  As such, I would not expect brain evolution to occur by a process of gradual accretion and  
change.  As for brain evolution in hominids - which you specifically address - it is not a simple matter of 
size.    For instance, if you look at the cranial cavities of hominids that in facial morphology appear similar, 
you see extraodinarily different configurations, such as in how far forward the frontal lobes extend over the 
orbital regions, how deeply set the cribriform plate is, or how excavated the hypophyseal fossa is. One can 
also see major differences in degrees of basicranial flexion - with great flexion supposedly being indicative 
of the capacity for language. The cranial capacities of these different hominid morphs - potential species - 
may be similar, but focusing on that measure obscures the  
important and very interesting features of cerebral morphology.  In one way, these differences make more 
difficult the task of sorting out relationships among these different hominids.  But they also show a more 
realistic picture of human evolution than thinking that there were only a few species, which transformed 
unilinearly from one to another culminating in Homo sapiens.  There are some hominids that had the same 
external cerebral and basicranial configurations we see in ourselves, yet they appear to be evolutionarily 
less closely related to us than other hominid species. 
Quartz: I agree with you. It would be important to correlate morphological changes with environmental 
changes, but this is too complex for now. I think physical records should be integrated with molecular 
genetics. People in La Jolla are pushing to see if there is genomic work to be done on Chimps, to see if 
there is some comparative work being done. Better understanding of mechanisms could give us much better 
understanding of…[not transcribed] 
 
Bickle: I find your results from the honeybee exciting, because they correlate nicely with what is emerging 
in the molecular literature right now. The literature on consolidation, for example, shows that when you 
move from drosophila through aplysia to transgenic mice, you find the same story at the molecular level 
inside the cell across species. My guess is that in this case the similarity is down to the level of the same 
second messenger pathway, and to the level of gene expression and proteins. There is 95% identity in 
amino acid sequences--100% in the key phosphorylation box residues--when you are moving from fruit fly 
 
 
 
to seaslug to mouse and presumably to human beings. It seems to me that Quartz’s results correlate nicely 
with the claim of unitary mechanisms emerging  
in molecular biology. 
Quartz: The correspondences with the molecular level that Bickle has mentioned could be interesting. This 
may allow us to see what kind of substrate there is for cognitive architecture. I want to add, also in response 
to a point raised earlier by Sullivan, that we are also doing functional imagining, in order to get a better 
feeling of how cognitive functioning is mediated.  
Fabrega: In your paper there was a strong critique of evolutionary psychology. You criticized the use 
Tooby and Cosmides make of the notion of modules, so I was a little surprised to see that you allowed in 
your paper subcortical modules. This also relates to Griffiths’ ideas on affect programs, which I suspect to 
be subcortical. But the question is: since so much of emotion is neocortical, social, communicative, and 
cultural, how do we account for that? Could there not be a notion of module working there too? 
Quartz: I think modules should be subcortical. If we take modularity seriously, we should acknowledge 
that affect programs have modular aspects, for example their cognitively impenetrability. I think that 
developmentally they work with a scaffolding function for more complex emotions, for example shame . . . 
Griffiths: There is a passage in Gaulin and McBurney where they suggest a module even for existential 
angst! 
Quartz: I believe that ultimately the strict notion of modularity, even at the subcortical level, will have to 
be tempered when we start thinking about function. The trouble with modularity is that it invites thinking 
about the brain in a way that ends up neglecting its integrated function. This is due in part to the pragmatic 
utility of saying “this area does X”, “this area does Y”, and so on.   
Brandon: Development has been poorly understood for a long time, now we know more about it, and we 
hope it will affect the way in which evolutionary biology is done. My question is: What makes the brain 
special? What is about it that turns the developmental story about the brain into a reason to think that the 
brain, or at least the cortex, is not modular?  
Quartz: There are two ways to approach this. One is to ask what are the principles of information 
processing in the brain. For example, given a high degree of functional integration, which consequences are 
there for development? The answer is that it allows a high degree of interactivity with the environment, and 
it allows the statistical structure of the environment to be reflected in cortical representations. This gives a 
high degree of plasticity to its development. The best example is given by __ and ___: frogs have no 
binocular vision, and if you add a third eye in the middle of the forehead, which structure to you get at the 
end of development? It turns out you get high degree of developmental contingency/plasticity with cortex. 
You get dominance column. This is a robust flexibility principle. [not transcribed] 
Griffiths: The fact that you get dominance columns would be cited by people in the evo-devo literature as 
evidence for developmental modularity, because they rely on completely different notion of module. 
Brandon: A lot of people believe in evo-devo, but the question is: what is development going to contribute 
exactly? More specifically, is the brain really very special? 
McClelland: Many investigators have shown that dominance column can come about also with other 
explanations. It is not so easy to understand whether this is a general claim. 
Griffiths: A lot of these guys are interested in idea of modules as things that are part of emergent 
developmental structures. You have underlying genetic underpinning, but then developmental structures 
have emergent levels of structure and there are these recognizable identities that emerge in that structure. 
So your developmental biology is giving you these new objects of knowledge, emergent with respect to the 
genome but which can pop up in funny places…this relates to stuff about homology between people and 
honeybees, which seems quite strange a notion of homology, since their common ancestor did not have a 
nervous system (?). The biological homology concept is something like saying “because given the way 
organisms grow, the same thing is happening twice”. Genes are homologous, but this is not enough to make 
the structures homologous. 
Bickle: The story that developmental neurobiology is starting to tell us is that what is special about the 
brain is the extent of immediate early gene expression, in comparison to other types of biological tissues. 
Our ancestors did share the molecular mechanisms we share with honeybees, and drosophila, even though 
they did not have a nervous system. 
Stotz: I want to express my sympathy for your project, not only for the evo-devo approach, but especially 
for mentioning Piaget in your paper. I think a number of Piaget’s insights should be more emphasized, and 
I am glad you started doing so. For example, Piaget characterized organism as active seekers of 
experiences, a very different account from the behaviorist one, which portrays organisms as passive with 
 
 
 
respect to their experiences. Another important aspect of Piaget’s contribution is the constructivist 
approach which you have mentioned. I want to add that we should not forget that this constructivism has a 
fundamental interactivist side. This is important, because it distinguishes Piagetian constructivism from 
cognitivist constructivism, which excludes interaction, and from social constructivism, which represents the 
other pole. The third aspect I want to mention, which provides further evidence to the fact that you are not 
trying to revive behaviorism, is that Piaget wanted to resolve the dichotomy between nativism and 
behaviorism. There is a strong emphasis in his work on the fact that we need both self-regulation and 
adaptation. 
McGuire: Why do you think that massive modularity has a distorted cultural component? 
Quartz: One of the things we emphasized in our BBS article was the notion of progressive externalization, 
namely the process whereby neural development becomes regulated by environmental influences over 
longer periods of postnatal exposure. The crucial question is: what is the source of complexity? You can 
either have a very complex genome and a system of modules, or you can have developmental plasticity. 
The idea of developmental plasticity is that you have a latent structure that you can then use, in a 
contingent way, to construct adaptive representations throughout interactive development. Complexity in 
this case is obtained by using the structure of the environment to construct adaptive representations. My 
point is that getting away from the paradigm of modularity allows you to see the central importance of the 
interaction between developing brains and culture. The focus should shift on understanding their co-
evolution. We should realize that our cognitive capacities can be used to structure the environment and take 
advantage of it in all sorts of ways. This is the very phenomenon that modularity tends to hide, in a sense 
impeding our understanding of the ontogenetic role of culture. 
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